Politics in Thailand: Thaksin times

Nguồn tin: nguontinviet.com

LESS than two years ago Thaksin Shinawatra, a former prime minister of Thailand and something of an establishment outsider, appeared to be winning his bitter battle against the traditional elites in Bangkok, the capital. They, led by the army, had toppled Mr Thaksin in a coup in 2006. But Pheu Thai, the party he directs from self-imposed exile in Dubai, rocketed back to power in 2011 with his sister, Yingluck, at the helm. And in November 2013 Ms Yingluck’s government promised a blanket amnesty wiping out a corruption charge preventing Mr Thaksin from returning.

The pledge proved a colossal mistake, for it galvanised Mr Thaksin’s enemies. Last May Ms Yingluck was ousted by the constitutional court and, shortly after, the army seized power in another coup. And in recent weeks the prospects for Mr Thaksin and his political movement have darkened greatly, perhaps irrevocably. On January 23rd the generals’ rubber-stamp parliament retrospectively impeached Ms Yingluck, banning her from politics; she also faces criminal charges. Her party has begged its “red shirt” supporters not to protest, for fear of giving the junta an excuse to prolong its rule. Yet the generals seem bent on eradicating the influence of Mr Thaksin, who has dominated Thailand’s political discourse since he first swept to power in 2001.

Ms Yingluck’s impeachment—ostensibly for failing to tackle fraud made possible by a costly rice-subsidy scheme—marks a new phase in the army’s rule. Right after last year’s coup, General Prayuth Chan-ocha and his fellow officers said they favoured reconciliation over revenge. By and large, elected politicians of all hues co-operated with the army, leaving journalists, academics and other activists to suffer most under martial law (a large number of dissidents are thought to be in jail). But the persecution of Ms Yingluck suggests that “the gloves are starting to come off”, says Daniel Giles of Vriens & Partners, a political consultancy. The criminal case against Ms Yingluck could mean ten years in jail—a threat that, the generals perhaps hope, will encourage her to flee the country.

The junta’s shift may be a self-interested move. Some politicians from the royalist establishment, including in the Democrat Party that is loosely affiliated with it, seem to have thought that the junta would quickly hand power over to them, as happened after the previous coup. Yet this junta seems inclined to entrench its own authority. Offering up Ms Yingluck to the establishment could buy the generals time. Her impeachment also helps vindicate the coup-makers’ narrative, useful to the junta, that politicians elected through democratic means, rather than appointed by them, will lead Thailand to ruin.

With Ms Yingluck under attack, Pheu Thai will need to find a new leader—hard when martial laws forbid unauthorised assemblies. But Mr Thaksin’s troubles run deeper. An army purge of the police force, supposedly to battle corruption, has removed many crucial allies (Mr Thaksin was a police chief before telecoms deals made him rich). Entrepreneurs with links to Mr Thaksin’s business interests are also being hounded.

For many years Mr Thaksin was thought to be friendly with the crown prince, Maha Vajiralongkorn. Yet recent announcements from the palace—including the prince’s decision to divorce his wife, little-loved by the establishment—suggest that the unpopular prince has come to some kind of accommodation with the generals, whose support will make it easier for him to succeed his frail father, King Bhumibol Adulyadej.

As for the huge loyalty Mr Thaksin enjoyed in Pheu Thai’s heartlands in the poor, rural north and north-east of the country, that can no longer be taken for granted. Disillusion is taking hold. Some party members resent the cack-handed efforts to have Mr Thaksin pardoned in late 2013, which only led to renewed army rule.

Picking a new leader will widen divisions in Pheu Thai, some of whose members may be tempted away should the generals propose some kind of national unity party to help string out their rule. The presumption is that a Shinawatra clan member will be Pheu Thai’s next leader—perhaps Mr Thaksin’s brother-in-law, Somchai Wongsawat; another sister, Yaowapha Wongsawat; or his son, Panthongtae. Yet at least one party activist has hinted that a leader not so obviously in hock to Mr Thaksin would be better, such as Chaturon Chaisang, Ms Yingluck’s deputy.

The junta seems to be playing a long game. It probably wants to keep power to see through the succession, and secure its own influence, when the current monarch dies. (It may have to hang on for years, including a suitable mourning period.) There is talk of having a new constitution drafted later this year, probably with provisions to prevent Pheu Thai or something like it ever returning to office.

Yet sooner or later, the junta will face resistance from an electorate with vigorously democratic elements. Reconciliation is still badly needed. In particular, destroying Mr Thaksin and his family as a political force will not prevent the poor Thais who repeatedly vote for them from demanding their say in how the country is run. Pressing the criminal case against Ms Yingluck, Thailand’s first female prime minister, may yet provoke sympathy for her, at home and abroad. The junta talks of bringing a lasting peace in Thailand’s long-running class wars. But that looks ever more distant.

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